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Like other countries in the process of  converting from centrally planned to 
decentralized market economies, Poland has a pension system that is undergo- 
ing change.' This paper explores issues that arose in considering the problems 
and proposals for change in the Polish pension system. Since one of the pro- 
posals is to imitate the Chilean system and replace part of the Polish system 
with individual retirement accounts, it seems useful also to discuss the Chilean 
system as well as a partially similar proposal made for the United States. 
Before  the  start of  transition,  the  Polish pension  system was a  defined- 
benefit system, with benefits based on years of service and earnings in the last 
twelve months of work. No records on individual workers were kept by the 
social insurance institution, which relied on information provided by employ- 
ers. It is widely understood that a decentralized economy cannot base a social 
insurance system on a short earnings record. The incentives for both legal and 
illegal manipulation are too great. Thus, it is essential that a set of  earnings 
records be built up as quickly as possible and that the pension system not rely 
too heavily on the short earnings records that will become available in the near 
future. The current situation also involves great tension between  the severe 
budget shortfall of the government and the low level of income of many retirees 
(and future retirees). Thus, there is great need to concentrate benefits on those 
most in need, recognizing that the system should evolve as longer earnings 
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records become available and as the budget situation and income levels evolve. 
The current system also has excessively easy access to disability benefits,  a 
defect widely seen to be in need of correction. 
It has been proposed that part of the current defined-benefit system be re- 
placed by a privatized defined-contribution system, partially imitating Chile’s. 
However, the Chilean system involves a great deal of regulation of  the privat- 
ized fund managers, a level of  regulation that may be beyond the regulatory 
abilities of Poland. In any case, one can ask whether the regulatory abilities 
might not be better allocated to the banking system. In addition, the Chilean 
system currently costs about I5 percent of tax revenues per year in administra- 
tive costs. This is far higher than the costs of  administration  of  the current 
system. It is not clear that privatization will bring benefits that exceed this cost. 
Moreover, one can consider a defined-contribution  system that is not privat- 
ized. This might have many of the advantages of the proposal with fewer com- 
plications.  Whether  privatized  or  not,  high  interest  rates  in  a  defined- 
contribution system represent an increase in government implicit and explicit 
liabilities relative to those in a continued defined-benefit system. Unless the 
change in pension system affects other taxes or government spending so as to 
increase  investment,  a  high  interest  rate  may  be  harmful  for society  even 
though it is good for those who will receive higher benefits from the govern- 
ment budget. The paper presents these issues, along with a considerable num- 
ber of additional issues in the design of pension systems. 
The discussion of  retirement  and disability pensions  is divided  into three 
groups of questions. The first group considers incentive and insurance aspects 
of pensions and the distribution of pensions while holding constant the aggre- 
gate level of expenditures. I will refer to this as the microeconomics  of pen- 
sions and discuss some of  these issues in section 10.1, along with a presenta- 
tion of recent Polish legislation. The second group of questions relates to the 
aggregate budget for pension expenditures, and these questions are discussed 
in section 10.2. The third group of questions has to do with funding, involving 
the role of funding in the intertemporal pattern of consumption cuts to finance 
benefits, the effect of funding on other government expenditures, and the effect 
of funding on the politics of pension determination in the future. These issues 
are discussed in section 10.3 along with a Polish proposal to create individual 
funded accounts, a proposal for reform of  Social Security in the United States, 
and the experience  with individual  accounts  in Chile. The possible roles of 
public pension funds in the privatization  of firms and in the development of 
the capital market, as well as issues of the private annuity and private pension 
markets, are raised in section 10.4. 
10.1  The Microeconomics of Pensions 
To start the discussion of the microeconomics  of pensions,  1 give a rough 
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mention of the previous system.2 This description is approximate because the 
system is complex and in the midst of  reform, with some grandfather clauses 
in the new legislation. Moreover, there is the possibility of further change. In 
December 1990, pensions for those over age eighty were reformed. In Novem- 
ber  199  1, a new  law changed the basic  pension  calculation  for all workers 
and retirees. 
10.1.1  Description 
The pension system inherited from the pretransition regime was very gener- 
ous relative to wages, although the low level of real wages means that many 
pensioners are living in poverty. The old system relied heavily in its function- 
ing on the role of  state enterprises  in the ec~nomy.~  The pension  system is 
administered by ZUS (Zaklad Ubezpieczen Spolecznych, the social insurance 
institution). ZUS maintains no records on active workers. For  pension recipi- 
ents, ZUS does preserve in its records the elements relevant for the determina- 
tion of benefits in the benefit formula. There are four elements. First is whether 
the pension is a retirement pension or a disability pension. Second is the final 
wage level of the benefit recipient. Third is the calculation of the number of 
years of work. Fourth is the particular industry of the worker if that is relevant 
for either benefit determination or benefit eligibility. In the new law, the depen- 
dence of pension benefits on industry was largely eliminated. 
Forjnancing,  there is a payroll tax levied on the aggregate payrolls of enter- 
prises. At present, the tax rate is 45 percent, with 43 percent going to ZUS and 
2 percent for unemployment benefits that are not distributed by ZUS.4  In 1990, 
contributions covered about 88 percent of expenditures. The deficit is financed 
from general revenues. In  1990, benefits made up 19.6 percent of aggregate 
disposable income, with 49 percent  of the benefits being for retirement  and 
survivor pensions,  23 percent for disability pensions, and the remaining  28 
percent  for family  allowance, maternity,  sickness, and work injury benefits. 
Administrative costs run 4 percent of  benefits, half of which went to the post 
office for hand delivery of benefits (Tymowska and Wisniewski 1991). 
The age of eligibility for retirement benefits is sixty-five for men and sixty 
for women. However, workers can become eligible for benefits at a younger 
age if they have worked for a sufficient number of years in a designated indus- 
try. As a result of the various ways of becoming eligible for benefits, the aver- 
age  age  of  new  retirees  is fifty-eight  for men  and fifty-seven  for women 
(Tymowska and Wisniewski  199  1). Eligibility for disability benefits is based 
2. In this description, I am drawing on Barr (1991) and Henderson (1991) as well as conversa- 
tions with Polish economists. 
3. In addition to the pension system for industrial workers, there is a separate, sizable pension 
system for the agricultural sector and a system for priests, neither of which I discuss. In June 1991, 
there were 6,137,000 recipients of labor pensions and 1,765,000 recipients of pensions for farmers 
(Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, August 1991). 
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on the certification by a doctor of  inability to work. The system recognizes 
three different levels of disability: level 1 is an unambiguous inability to work, 
level 3 an unclear inability to work, and level 2 in between. In 1990, nearly 40 
percent of  benefits in force were disability benefits (Topinski and Wisniewski 
1991a). It was believed by analysts that the standards for disability were not 
adequately policed. Benefit calculations are different for the different levels of 
disability. Benefit eligibility also depends on the cessation of full-time work.5 
Under the new law, no benefits are paid to those eligible for benefits but still 
earning more than  120 percent of the national average wage; benefits are re- 
duced by 24 percent of the national average wage for those earning between 
60 and 120 percent of the national average wage. Survivor benefits are paid to 
children, the surviving spouse, and, sometimes, surviving parents. There is a 
family supplement  of  10 percent  of the national average wage. Benefits are 
fully subject to income tax, having been increased just enough to offset the 
basic income tax rate. 
Before the start of  the transition, the benejt formula was in nominal terms; 
the very high levels of inflation that occurred in the 1980s resulted in periodic 
adjustments of benefits for those already retired. These adjustments often in- 
volved raising the minimum benefit, resulting in cohorts of workers receiving 
the same benefit level. The current reform is designed to restructure the pen- 
sion system on the basis of previous earnings records rather than simply ad- 
justing for the most recent inflation without adjusting for the somewhat arbi- 
trary corrections for earlier inflation. Thus, benefits are based on the earnings 
records, with indexing of  records for the determination  of benefits  for those 
newly retired and indexing of benejrs after retirement. In both cases, the index 
used is the national average wage. Benefits in force are adjusted quarterly, if 
the adjustment is at least 5 percent. There is also a minimum pension of 35 
percent of  the national average wage. 
The formula in the new law is that the worker receives 24 percent of the 
national average wage plus 1.3 percent per year “worked” of the individual’s 
“final” wage adjusted for the increase of the national average wage since the 
year that the individual’s final wage was earned.6 In formula terms, the pension 
can be written as 
e, = a W, + bn,r,  W,, 
where el,  is benefits for person i in year t, W,  is national average wages in year 
t, nr  is “adjusted” years of work for person i, rl is the average of w,/Ws  over the 
relevant averaging period, wis  is wages that were earned by person i in year s, 
and a and b are constants. 
5. However, under previous law, working 90 percent of full-time did not bar  individuals from 
receiving either disability or retirement benefits. Such years of additional work after retirement 
resulted in a new (higher) benefit calculation. 
6. This law has been found unconstitutional. Nevertheless, it remains useful to see the shape of 
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In the debate over pension reform, the Sejm first passed a law with a equal 
to 25 percent rather than  24 percent and a b of  1.5 percent rather  than  1.3 
percent. The calculation of “adjusted” years worked includes adjustments for 
education, military service, and child care. For a noncontributory year, the ben- 
efit calculation uses the factor 0.7 percent (0.9 percent in the first plan) rather 
than  1.3 percent. In terms of the formula as written above, adjusted years of 
work include 7/13 times the number of allowed noncontributory years. Thus, 
a retiree with twenty-four working years and six allowed noncontributory years 
would have 27.2 adjusted years, 90.7 percent of the adjusted years of someone 
who had worked thirty years. This is fairly close to a calculation based simply 
on age. The years used for calculating the individual’s final wage are initially 
the best consecutive three calendar years out of the last twelve. The number of 
years used in calculating the individual average wage increases by one per year 
until it reaches ten (out of the last twenty).’ The length of the averaging period 
depends on the year of retirement, not the year of eligibility (or date of birth). 
The formula for disabled retirees is basically the same, with an inclusion in 
the formula of  years until  “retirement” (twenty-five years of  service or age 
sixty) treated the same as the noncontributory years in the retirement benefit 
formula.x 
There is also a cup on benejits that comes from a ceiling on the final wage 
usable in the benefit formula, with the cap equal to 2.5 times the national aver- 
age wage (three in the first plan). 
10.1.2  Discussion 
The image of the system held by analysts with whom I talked was that re- 
placement rates (the ratios of  benefits to wages) were very high by Western 
standards, but, with very low wages, the living standards of many of the retir- 
ees were very  This contributed to the perceived need for a highly redis- 
tributive formula. 
It was widely recognized among the pension authorities with whom I talked 
that a final wage formula based on a short averaging period is not viable in the 
kind of private economy that Poland is evolving into. There are three obvious 
problems for final wage systems that will lead some of the people to have very 
high final wages and so very high pension benefits. One element is direct fraud 
and misreporting of final wages. This is relatively easy in a system where ZUS 
maintains no records and one goes to one’s employer for documentation of 
final earnings (taxes paid by enterprises have been paid on the total wage bill 
without any reporting separately of wages by individuals). The second element 
7. Under previous law, benefits were based on earnings in the last twelve months of work. 
8. While  the  special  supplementary pension  for particular industries was eliminated, miners 
receive more than one year of service for benefit calculations per year of service under ground. 
9. Average replacement rates were reported to be 80 percent in Poland, in contrast to 41  percent 
in the United States (Hambor 1992).  In 1991,  the average benefit (disability and retirement) was 
Z1  1,050,000  ($95.00) per month, equal to 62 percent of  the national average wage (Atkins 1991). 76  Peter Diamond 
is the rise of  implicit contracts that  will result in  workers getting very high 
final wages presumably taken implicitly out of earlier earnings or the earnings 
of younger workers. This will again make the pension system very expensive 
and uneven across workers depending on the extent of  their access to such an 
implicit contract. The third element is the possibility of  additional work, for 
example, overtime, to boost the earnings of workers in their last year or last 
three years. 
In thinking about the magnitude of these problems, it is useful to recognize 
that, with an annuity based on final earnings, the return to shifting earnings 
is very large. One would even find it profitable to report very  high wages  in 
circumstances where high wages were subject to both income tax and payroll 
tax because the return would be so substantial. As a rough calculation, with 
a three-year averaging period,  each additional zloty of earnings yields hn/3 
additional zlotys in benefits in the first year, with the amount indexed to na- 
tional average wages for the rest of the retiree’s life (plus the possibility of a 
survivor’s benefit). With a h of  1.3 percent and an n, of 30 (roughly the aver- 
age), the return is a wage-indexed 13 percent per year for the rest of life. 
Moreover, the effect of pensions based on final average wage4 on the use of 
overtime by older workers is clearly illustrated by experiences in the West. For 
example, the MBTA (bus and subway system) in Boston has such a pension 
system, one based on a four-year average. Also in the union  contract is the 
right of senior workers to claim available overtime if they want it. As a result, 
workers in their sixties at the MBTA work very long hours and get large pen- 
sions. This came to the attention of the public in  1978, when  a Green Line 
train plowed into another train at the Arlington Street station, injuring twenty- 
one persons. The driver had worked twenty-five straight hours, had six hours 
off,  and had  gone straight back  to work. It was reported  that  he averaged 
seventy-five hours a week during 1977 (Boston Globe, 19 January, 6 and  10 
May 1978). 
The use of a formula combining years of work with a relatively short averag- 
ing period creates an unattractive pattern of work incentives across workers of 
different ages. For workers who are merely contributing a year toward the ben- 
efit calculation, the tax is a deadweight burden on their labor supply without 
any offsetting benefit for marginal hours worked. On the other hand, for work- 
ers in a year that will go into the benefit calculation, the incentive for additional 
labor supply from the benefit calculation can easily exceed the cost from taxes, 
resulting in another distortion. That is, there is a double distortion involved in 
the use of a short averaging period. For years that will not enter the averaging 
period, the payroll tax is a pure tax on the margin, generating the usual dead- 
weight burden. For years that do count for averaging purposes, the value of 
additional benefits less taxes will be positive, again generating a deadweight 
burden. Thus, if one is to maintain a system with a defined-benefit calculation 
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to  late  years,  the  fewer  the  distortions  that  will  be  associated  with  labor 
In addition to the effect on incentives of  the use of a short earnings period 
in determining the average wage, this use also has implications for the fairness 
of the system and its success in fulfilling its role of giving a sensible pattern of 
replacement  rates. In a private enterprise  economy,  individual  earnings are 
highly stochastic."  The fraction of the population with smoothly growing an- 
nual earnings is not large.'?  Thus, the use of  a short earnings period results in 
a highly random distribution of pensions. This is not fair under many concep- 
tions of fairness. In addition, if replacement  rates are meant to relate to the 
standard of living to which individuals became accustomed, the use of a short 
averaging period defeats this purpose since a short period of earnings is not a 
good proxy for lifetime income and therefore the standard of living. 
ZUS has discussed the need to develop a computerized  system of  tracking 
individual earnings but does not seem to feel that such a system is urgently 
needed. This was in contrast with the tax authorities, who are hard at work on 
a computerized system felt to be necessary for collecting taxes under the new 
income tax scheme. Thus, it would make sense to have ZUS piggyback on the 
large investment that the tax authorities are making, yielding an earlier tracking 
of earnings records than would occur with a delayed start. Taking a subtotal of 
earnings subject to ZUS taxation would not be a problem for the tax authority's 
computer system being installed. Moreover, direct linking of tax and ZUS re- 
cords would affect the incentive to underreport income for tax purposes. With 
taxable income eventually becoming the basis for pension receipt, there is less 
incentive for income-tax evasion. Again, there is an interaction between incen- 
tives for tax evasion and the length of the averaging period. Even with a ten- 
year averaging period, the incentive for tax evasion among younger workers 
remains high since there is no benefit payoff for any reporting above the mini- 
mum necessary for receiving credit for a year of  service. This combining of 
tax and insurance contribution records also represents a structure for beginning 
to inform workers about the value of benefits to be received as well as taxes 
paid and therefore, it is to be hoped, for altering the behavioral response to 
ZUS taxes and with it deadweight burdens. 
The current  reform  is a change in benefit  calculation,  staying within  the 
structure of  the defined-benefit formula used  previously.  The legislated  in- 
crease in the averaging period for determining final wages represents a steady 
cut in benefits since a high average is used for the calculation. That is, selecting 
the three best years of  the last twelve is very likely to yield a higher average 
wage than selecting the best four of the last thirteen. In order to determine how 
supply.'O 
10. Of  course, in the short run with very high anticipated unemployment during the transition, 
1 1. I do not know how much earnings variation there was in Poland before transition. 
12. For the United States, see Consultant Panel (1976). 
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much of a benefit cut is implied, one would need a stochastic model of the age 
structure of earningsi3 
As employment records grow, it will become appropriate to rethink the ben- 
efit formula, both the values of the constants a and b and the structure of the 
formula. Now, the formula includes a flat benefit term  and a term that is a 
product of years worked and a final average wage, calculated over a short pe- 
riod. The growth of the length of the averaging period raises the question of 
the appropriateness of changing the relative sizes of the flat benefit term and 
the earnings-related benefit term in the formula. Moreover, once there are long 
earnings histories, it might be appropriate to change from a formula based on 
such a product to one based simply on average earnings, with years out of the 
labor force represented by zeros that go into the averaging calculation. Partial 
weight for years of child bearing, education, or military service could be in- 
cluded in such a formula, as at present,  by  imputing a wage level for such 
years for benefit calculation purposes. This could be done on a flat basis or 
proportionally to individual earnings in other years. That is, one can ask how 
the contribution to pension benefit of a year of military service should vary 
with the level of nonmilitary earnings. 
With increased years available in earnings records, there is less randomness 
in the relation between benefits and lifetime earnings. This represents one rea- 
son for a phased transition in the benefit formula with more reliance on individ- 
ual earnings and less on average earnings. Moreover, it is appropriate to con- 
sider a phased transition to a different degree of progressivity as the economy 
becomes richer. It might be useful to consider explicitly a time-varying benefit 
formula such that the constants a and b in the formula change by  a rule de- 
signed to preserve the cost of pensions for a given cohort (based on age, not 
retirement date). One would also want to think about adjusting the minimum 
pension as part of the same recon~ideration.’~ 
The steady increase in the length of earnings records raises the further ques- 
tion of whether lengthening the averaging period and otherwise preserving the 
structure of the benefit formula is the best mature structure. In particular, once 
one had a long earnings record for individuals, would one still want the same 
level of  importance given to years of  service? Consider two individiials with 
the same earnings level for the averaging period, which also equals the national 
average wage. Then each of them will receive .24 + .013n, times the average 
wage. Differences in earnings outside the averaging period do not affect bene- 
fits, although the number of years with earnings (or counting toward earnings) 
13. Such a model was estimated for the United States precisely to calculate the implications of 
a lengthening averaging period (see Baker and Diamond 1977; and Consultant Panel 1976). 
14. In  the United States, there is a legislated phase-in of  a delay  in  the ‘‘normal retirement 
age.” This is a legislated phase-in of  decreased benefits; the age of  eligibility for benefits was 
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does matter. There does not seem to be a clear case for this way  of  treating 
different years. 
In order to consider the question of redesigning the formula, it might be 
useful to rewrite it in a mathematically equivalent form, but one that might be 
more helpful. Consider listing the earnings of an individual for all the years of 
his life up to retirement age. There will be many zeros for years for which there 
is no credit. There will be many years with actual wages. There will be years 
that count as noncontributory years. The first step in the procedure is to select 
the years used to calculate the final wage. For these years, the actual wage is 
left for calculation purposes. For other years with positive earnings (that count 
toward years of service), the actual wage is replaced by the final wage. For 
noncontributory years of service, the wage attributed is seven-thirteenths of 
the final wage. The remaining years are left as zeros. Then an average is taken 
of all these years. This method gives the same calculation as the present one 
(up to a linear transformation). Thus, one is imputing to a year worked but not 
counted in the average for final wages a wage equal to the final wage. Thus, 
one is imputing to a noncontributory year a wage equal to 7/13 times the final 
wage. Taking this approach toward actual benefit calculations represents an- 
other way of thinking about both the transition and the final structure. One can 
then use a system where every year will count toward benefits, but not neces- 
sarily by taking a straight average. Having every year count should help ease 
the deadweight burdens from taxes used to finance the formula as well as help- 
ing with tax evasion and providing increased fairness. 
Under the income tax law that came into effect  1 January  1992, pension 
benefits are fully taxable under the income tax. Given the lack of a tight histori- 
cal link between benefits and past earnings, this seems an appropriate step in 
having  a suitable  distribution  of  after-tax  pension  incomes. As the  system 
evolves, and as private pensions grow up, it may become necessary to rethink 
the tax treatment of pensions to reflect fairness issues on a life-cycle basis as 
well as on a short-run-needs basis. Fairness issues depend on the tax treatment 
of payroll taxes for pensions, on tax treatment of both contributions for and 
benefits from private pensions, and on the tax treatment of the return to sav- 
ings generally. 
The earnings test described above has cliffs rather than a smooth decrease 
in benefits with respect to earnings. It also makes no exception for advanced 
ages. This limits the incentives for work beyond the retirement eligibility age 
that comes from anticipation of future benefits. In the United States, it is also 
true that Social Security benefits are (partially) subject to income taxation, and 
there  is an earnings test  (for beneficiaries  under seventy). The combination 
of  tax  and  earnings  test  further  concentrates  net  benefits  not  only  among 
15. The fact that private firms commonly use a final average wage and years of service formula 
does not imply that it is appropriate for a social insurance benefit formula. 80  Peter Diamond 
those with low incomes but also among those with low earnings (beyond the 
progressivity present in the benefit formula). The underlying logic behind hav- 
ing two separate bases for implicit and explicit taxation of benefits is that bene- 
fits are meant to replace lost earnings and to be concentrated among the cur- 
rently poor. Insofar as we think of the pension system as an insurance system 
as well as a forced savings system, this approach provides insurance against a 
short working life. With the rise of the income tax and the fact that benefits are 
taxable  under  the  income tax,  there  is  a  mechanism  in  place  for  having  a 
smoothly varying earnings test. 
Consideration of the link between continued work and pension benefits also 
raises the question of the role of actuarial adjustments of benefits, that is, the 
variation of the level of  benefits with the age at which they are first claimed. 
The current system has credits for years of  service, and this implies that an 
extra year of  work increases benefits. With a final benefit formula based on a 
short period of earnings, there is also the possibility of a sizable increase in 
the final wage for benefit calculation purposes as a result of  an additional year 
of earnings. However, the increase in the averaging period based on the date 
of claiming benefits offsets this increase for some workers. Thus. there are two 
routes to increased benefits  as a result of continued  work,  through  years of 
service and through the calculation of the final average. Neither route involves 
an  adjustment  of  the  flat benefit  part  of  the  formula.  The question  here  is 
whether delayed benefits should be partially compensated by  increased bene- 
fits in a different way. With the lengthening averaging period, the incentive for 
continued work will decrease over time. With a benefit formula depending on 
fuller earnings  histories,  one can consider  the incentives to continued  work 
(and earlier work) implicit in actuarial adjustment as well as the question of 
the timing of paying benefits that have the same expected present discounted 
value. Insofar as one is trying to insure length of  working life, optimal insur- 
ance principles call for a less than full  actuarial adjustment  for delayed  re- 
tirement. 
The current system has special rules for particular industries, although far 
less than previously. In Western economies, it is common for private pensions 
to differ in anticipated retirement ages even when the social insurance program 
does not distinguish. Given the presence of labor mobility between industries 
and occupations,  it seems appropriate  to relegate  this  differential to  private 
pensions.  In  addition,  with  the  current  system  financed  by  uniform  taxes, 
industry-varying benefits imply a redistribution  toward  some industries that 
seems unlikely to have good efficiency effects. 
A rethinking of disability standards is obviously an important part of a re- 
form of the overall pensions  system. The force of the importance of  such a 
rethinking can be seen from the fact that, in 1990, nearly 40 percent of benefi- 
ciaries were receiving disability pensions. For the short run, one needs to rec- 
ognize the role of disability benefits in lieu of long-term unemployment bene- 
fits. It would  not  be  surprising  if  there  were  a concentration  among older 81  Pension Reform in a Transition Economy: Poland and Chile 
workers of the long-term  unemployment  caused by  the transition to market 
capitalism.  l6 
10.2  Aggregate Budget for Pensions 
There are two dimensions to  a consideration  of  the determination  of  the 
aggregate level of benefits. One is the familiar normative economic calculation 
trying to contrast the shadow value of resources in the hands of the government 
with the importance of additional benefits in the hands of retirees. This dimen- 
sion needs to be considered  both  in the  short run, where there is a serious 
overall budget problem for Poland, and in the longer term, where demographic 
developments will increase the burden of a fully wage-indexed  social insur- 
ance system.” The second dimension is the political economy of budget deter- 
mination, as it is affected by the design of institutions. 
While the Polish replacement rate is extremely high by Western standards, 
the standard of  living is extremely low, with the result that many retirees are 
living in poverty. This combination of factors makes one think that the level of 
progressivity  in the system could properly change significantly  over time as 
the economy grows; preservation of a high minimum pension to avoid poverty 
could go with a pattern of change in the benefit formula that will result in a 
steady shift over time in the degree of progressivity. Real growth relative to the 
minimum pension would represent some decrease in pension costs relative to 
the economy. Similarly, designing a system with progressivity in replacement 
rates that is not fully indexed to wages could help the long-run fiscal problem 
if there is real economic growth. Such a shift will not happen automatically, 
however, if  the system is indexed on the wage, as indeed it should be in the 
short run, given the unpredictability of the behavior of real wages in the near 
term during the transition. This again raises the question of alternative struc- 
tures for the benefit formula, both for the short run and as a planned transition. 
It is also important to recognize the role of indexing in protecting pensions 
against  inflation.  During  the  1980s, difficulties in the overall Polish budget 
contributed to the rise of inflation. With unindexed pensions that were adjusted 
incompletely  and  periodically,  a  considerable  amount of  the  redistribution 
from inflation fell on pensioners. With pensions now indexed, the scope for 
such transfers is considerably  reduced,  although lags in the recalculation  of 
pensions  would  imply  redistribution  from inflation, particularly  if  inflation 
rates are very high. In addition to considering the link from the budget to pen- 
16. More generally. one needs to recognize that disability evaluation is subject to both type-I 
and type-I1 errors. For evidence from the United States of the significant fraction of workers de- 
nied disability benefits who never work again, see Bound (1989). For a discussion of the principles 
behind selecting disability and retirement benefit levels in recognition of  the errors in disability 
eligibility determination, see Diamond and Sheshinski (1992). 
17. The ratio of workers to retirees changes from 2.20 to 1 in 1990 to 1.76  to 1 in 2020 (Topinski 
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sions through inflation, it is natural to ask about possible planned real changes 
as the budgetary picture changes: To what extent does one want to change the 
earnings test as part of changing progressivity? Is there a case for changing 
benefit determination  for those already retired to price rather than  wage in- 
dexing  at some point  in the future? Should there be phased  benefit  cuts  in 
advance of the demographic changes coming early next century? 
In addition to considering normative issues in the determination of the level 
of  aggregate expenditure on benefits, it is important to consider the interaction 
between  the organization  of  the pension  system and the politics of  pension 
determination, beyond the role of indexing in the effect of inflation. The pres- 
ent payroll tax is levied only on enterprises and is not normally seen by work- 
ers. Thus, it is natural to consider changing the system along the lines of the 
change that was done to incorporate the income tax, making workers aware of 
the presence of the income tax. In the case of  the income tax, on  1 January 
1992 the wages of all workers were raised to offset the fact that they are now 
subject to income tax. The plan  was to leave workers approximately  in the 
same position as before.lX  A similar move could be made to shift the basis of 
ZUS taxation from being fully on the employer to being partially on the em- 
ployee, with half and half a common, but not universal, Western number (US. 
Department  of  Health  and Human Services). This would  have no short-run 
economic effects but would matter in the longer run if it affected the percep- 
tions of workers and therefore the political pressures in the pension determina- 
tion process.  I think that there is every reason to think that there would  be 
such an effect and that such a change would have a moderating effect on the 
determination of expenditures for the pension system. 
10.3  Funding 
The Polish pension system does not have its own fund. In the past, the pay- 
roll tax exceeded the expenditures of ZUS, with the surplus going into the 
general budget. At present, the payroll tax is inadequate to cover the expendi- 
tures of ZUS, and the deficit  is coming out of  general revenues. There has 
been serious consideration in Poland of  partially imitating Chile and creating 
individually funded pension accounts managed by private firms (see Topinski 
and Wisniewski 1991a, 1991b). Unlike Chile, where the entire social security 
system was replaced by this new system, the proposal for Poland is to preserve 
the current benefit formula up to 120 percent of the national average wage and 
to replace the benefit levels between there and the cutoff of 2.5 times national 
average earnings by a funded system. 
One can envision a strictly pay-as-you-go pension system, where either ben- 
18. Since the payroll tax rate was not changed at  the same time as wages were increased, this 
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efits or taxes or some combination is adjusted on a year-by-year basis so that 
the earmarked tax revenues exactly equal benefit payments (plus administra- 
tive costs). I am not aware of any use of such a system. Thus, while it is com- 
mon to refer to pension systems without  substantial funds as pay as you go, 
they are not in a strict sense pay-as-you-go  systems. Instead, they are systems 
with  defined-benefit  rules,  earmarked  revenues,  and reliance  on  a political 
mechanism to deal with the implications of differences in the annual rates of 
flows of benefits and taxes. The crisis in social security that occurs from time 
to time in different countries is generally a political crisis, not an economic 
one. It comes from this structure and the political  difficulty of  either raising 
taxes or cutting benefits. Such crises would not happen if there were a truly 
pay-as-you-go system or an adequately funded and planned system.19  From the 
perspective of avoiding crises and of figuring  out how  the government  will 
respond to the ones that do occur, it is natural to ask about the implications of 
having an explicit fund that grows at a rate equal to the difference between 
earmarked taxes and expenditures plus the value of  some interest rate times 
the level of the fund. Such a fund will not start with a zero balance if there is 
a plan for a transition to a new benefit formula that starts by endowing either 
individual accounts or an aggregate fund. Such an endowment can come either 
from giving the fund government debt (perhaps debt specially designed for 
this purpose) or from giving the fund claims on assets being privatized. 
There are many dimensions to the implications both of having a fund and of 
having different ways of relating benefits and taxes to the presence of a fund 
(either de jure or de facto). In order to separate out the different factors, I 
proceed in the following sequence of steps. In section 10.3.1, I briefly describe 
a concrete proposal that has been made for Poland to make clear the relevance 
of the materials that follow. In section 10.3.2, I focus on the microeconomic 
implications of the use of individual accounts for the determination of benefits. 
For this purpose, I consider how a mature system with such a funded basis 
might work. For purposes of concreteness, I consider a proposal for the United 
States put forward by Boskin, Kotlikoff, and Shoven (1988). In section 10.3.3, 
I turn to describing the system in Chile. I ask about the role of a fund in affect- 
ing the level of other government expenditures and the response of aggregate 
pension expenditures to aggregate shocks. A further question that arises in this 
context is the extent to which having individual accounts creates a difference 
from just having an aggregate fund. Because part of the logic behind proposals 
for creation of a fund is to decrease the role of the government, it is appropriate 
to consider issues of alternative methods of portfolio management and of or- 
ganization of annuities for the retired. Considering Chile also raises issues of 
19. Each year in the United States, costs and revenues of the retirement system are forecast 
for the following seventy-five years. Of  course, such planning alone has not been sufficient to 
avoid crises. 84  Peter Diamond 
alternative ways of  dealing with the transition from the previous system to a 
newly designed system. Such a transition could be purely for new entrants into 
the  labor market. However, proposals  generally  assume a much  more rapid 
development of  the new  system by  incorporating  in it all individuals below 
some age, generally somewhere between forty and fifty. This raises the ques- 
tion  of the design of  the transition,  which  can naturally be either backward 
looking or forward looking. In  section  10.3.4, I  review transition considera- 
tions in Chile and in the Polish proposal, recognizing in particular the com- 
plexities in the Polish context that come from the absence of individual earn- 
ings records. 
10.3.1  The Polish Proposal 
The Polish reform passed in November has a cap on benefits from the cap 
on final average wages set at 2.5 times the national average wage. It does not 
contain any comparable cap on wages subject to taxation, although the intro- 
duction of such a cap would not represent any significant change in the design 
of this system, merely a decrease in revenue and progressivity. The reform that 
was proposed by Topinski and Wisniewski ( 199 1 a, 199  1  b) would replace part 
of the earnings levels subject to the current benefit formula by an alternatively 
funded system. The proposal is to continue to use the existing defined-benefit 
formula up to a wage level of 1.2 times the national average wage.”’ This would 
include the full earnings of approximately 75 percent of the work force. Simi- 
larly, the revenue from the payroll tax on earnings up to this level would go to 
ZUS. For earnings above  1.2 times the national average wage (perhaps up to 
some alternative cap), the existing benefit formula would not apply; additional 
benefits would  instead be based on the outcomes associated  with  individual 
funded accounts. Individuals over age fifty-five would  remain subject to the 
existing  system. Individuals  under  fifty-five would  get an initial fund level 
based on their age and earnings in the year of transition. The calculation for 
the determination of the individual fund is forward looking, based on putting 
the individual at the same benefit level as with the current formula if the fore- 
casted  wage  growth and interest rate patterns hold  and the actuarial  factors 
come out as projected. Actual fund accumulation would depend on actual earn- 
ing levels above 1.2 times the national average wage and realized rates of return 
on the investments selected for the individual accounts. It is proposed to follow 
the Chilean pattern and have some number of regulated private portfolio man- 
agers to handle fund accumulation and investment. Individual accounts would 
be insured by the government. Some of the income would be used to purchase 
life and disability insurance policies for the workers; the rest would be accu- 
mulated for retirement. It is proposed that conversion of the fund to an annuity 
or individual phased withdrawal  would  happen at age sixty-five without any 
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earnings test.”  Moreover, borrowing against the account would be allowed for 
approved purposes.Z2 
Thinking about such a proposal, one needs to recognize that this is a com- 
pulsory savings program, with limited insurance elements apart from the con- 
version to an annuity, and with the capital accumulation forced to flow through 
the designated  intermediaries.  With individuals having forced savings rather 
than lower taxes, some will save more than they would have otherwise, which 
can be evaluated in terms of the usual paternalism that underlies much of social 
insurance. From the perspective of  an individual who would have saved other- 
wise, by  and large the payroll  tax  will  come out of  the  savings that  would 
have happened anyway, so we are getting a redistribution of the flow of capital 
accumulation through these intermediaries rather than through whatever alter- 
native allocation mechanism might have been employed. This system presumes 
that the level of redistribution  arising from the current benefit formula in the 
basic part of the pension system is sufficient and envisions no further redistri- 
bution through  the mechanism  of  the individual  accounts.  Of  course, there 
would also be a chain of derivative effects on wages, employment, and interest 
rates that I will not discuss. This proposal differs in many ways from the con- 
tinuation of the current structure. My purpose in this presentation is to isolate 
some of the differences by considering comparisons having only some of them. 
10.3.2  The U.S. Proposal 
In a thumbnail description, in the United States at present, there is a payroll 
tax on individual earnings up to a maximum level that covers full earnings for 
over 90 percent of  the labor force. The revenue finances disability insurance, 
survivor insurance for both children and spouses, and retirement benefits. The 
benefit system is based on families rather than individuals, but without record 
sharing. That is, there are explicit spouse benefits, with individuals receiving 
the higher of the benefits that they would receive as a spouse or as an individ- 
ual. Receipt of retirement benefits is based on a combination of age and earn- 
ings. Between sixty-two and seventy, one can receive benefits if one’s earnings 
are sufficiently low. Beyond seventy, benefits are paid independently  of earn- 
ings, Benefits are partially taxable. The level of initial benefits depends on the 
age at which they are first claimed and the earnings history. A piecewise linear 
formula relates benefits to the average of wage-indexed earnings in the thirty- 
five best earnings years, with declining marginal rates for progressivity. Notice 
21. The annuity would include survivor benefits. This approach, based on marital status at the 
time of retirement, is different in its treatment of divorce and remarriage from the American pro- 
posal described below, which is based on marital status at the time of taxation. After a divorce, 
there is no good reason to have a benefit dependent on the continued life of a former spouse, as in 
the U.S. proposal. On the other hand, the Polish proposal does little to protect divorced spouses, 
22. Chilean law attempts to prevent borrowing against the individual account. Allowing bor- 
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in this structure that paying benefits independently of age at some point is an 
important part of the incentive for individuals who want to go on working until 
an advanced age. 
The proposal for the United States was designed to stay rather close to the 
existing  U.S.  structure. As  such,  the  system  was  envisioned  as  a  wholly 
government-run and -organized system, with investment strictly in Treasury 
debt. In contrast with the defined-benefit approach of current law, the personal 
security account plan of  Boskin, Kotlikoff, and Shoven (1988) is a defined- 
contribution approach. Moreover, the approach treats the family at the time of 
taxation as the basis for future benefit receipt from that year’s taxes. Thus, the 
first step is to determine the taxes to be paid on the basis of aggregate family 
earnings. These taxes are then allocated separately and equally to husband and 
wife. The second step is to redistribute across individuals so that taxes that are 
the basis for future benefits are not the same as taxes paid. Low earners are 
credited with more than they paid, high earners with less.2’ Boskin, Kotlikoff, 
and Shoven consider no explicit redistribution between single individuals and 
married couples, although such a redistribution could also be done at this step. 
The credits available for an individual are then allocated to several uses. One 
is the purchase of five-year term disability insurance. Another is the purchase 
of  survivor insurance for children. Another is the purchase of  survivor insur- 
ance for the spouse. The rest goes for the purchase of  a real annuity that will 
begin payment at age sixty-two. 
In order to calculate the amount of this year’s contribution to the future real 
retirement annuity, one needs a life table and a real interest rate (or a sequence 
of interest rates). The life table is presumably the current life table (or possibly 
some projected life table based on trends in mortality improvement). The inter- 
est rate could be simply a market rate taken from the Treasury yield curve. 
Such an approach would require adjustment of taxes over time to balance the 
budget as taxes, interest rates, and demography develop. That is, there is an 
aggregate risk associated with interest rates and demography. This risk must 
be borne somewhere in the economy. 
This risk could be viewed as a problem for the income tax, with the risk 
shifted from the social insurance fund to the general fund. Alternatively, the 
social insurance system could be viewed as self-contained. Then the payroll 
tax would need to respond to these changes. Such induced tax changes would, 
in turn, result in additional benefit credits and thus further tax changes. To 
avoid having the system driven in this way, the authors propose that the interest 
rate be chosen to reflect the projected position of the social insurance fund, 
with taxes and benefits projected to balance. With a sizable actual fund to ab- 
sorb short-run fluctuations and to smooth projected long-term changes, smooth 
adjustment of the interest rate should be possible to keep the social insurance 
23. Thus, redistribution is done repeatedly on an  annual basis, rather than once on a lifetime 
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fund in rough balance at the level (of taxes or benefits) desired. Once an annu- 
ity has been allocated to an individual, that amount is not changed in response 
to future developments. Rather, the forecast of future conditions made in some 
year is the only basis for future benefits based on that year's earnings. That is, 
the social risks that arise later are spread among future benefit promises and 
future taxes, not past benefit promises. 
Some of the differences between this proposal and current U.S. practice are 
compatible with the current defined-benefit approach and are not part of my 
discussion. For example, equal sharing between husband and wife of their total 
annual earnings is something that has been repeatedly proposed for and is 
compatible with the existing system (see, e.g., Congressional Budget Office 
1986).'"  The two elements that I consider are the role of an earnings test and 
the determination of benefits for the newly retired. 
Earnings Test and Actuarial Adjustment 
Under the current U.S. system, benefits are reduced by one-third (for sixty- 
five to seventy-year-olds) or half (for sixty-two to sixty-five-year-olds)  of the 
excess of  earnings above an allowable amount.25  Thus, the system works to 
give larger benefits to people  who have shorter careers. This is a separate 
mechanism from relating the size of initial benefits to the date at which they 
are first claimed. Both these mechanisms are designed to provide insurance on 
the length of  working life, an otherwise uninsurable event. Moreover, to the 
extent that length of  working life for a given individual is independent of 
length of actual life, reflecting risks associated with job availability rather than 
health, the risk has a twofold nature: a shorter working life represents both a 
shorter time for the accumulation of income for retirement and a longer retire- 
ment period that needs to be financed. Thus, this seems a dimension of  risk 
well  worth  consideration in  the design of  a  social insurance program.  Of 
course, any attempt to insure length of working life by observing actual period 
of earnings involves a deadweight burden through the disincentive to additional 
work. Optimal insurance/tax considerations suggest there should be some posi- 
tive implicit tax on further work. Given the presence of an income tax already, 
this theorem, which is based on no taxation in the absence of an implicit tax 
from the insurance program, is not directly applicable but needs to be con- 
firmed in the context of the actual income-tax level. 
It is useful to consider the question of the relation between benefit level and 
age at which benefits are first claimed in a series of  steps. Assume that one 
has an annuity that begins at age sixty-five. One could then consider allowing 
24. Further differences relating to family structure are also ignored. For example, the current 
U.S. system provides survivor benefits for children out of  the general revenue pool. The Boskin, 
Kotlikoff, and Shoven proposal would deduct the expected cost of survivor benefits for children 
from the retirement benefits of their parents. 
25. $6,840 for sixty-two- to  sixty-five-year-olds  and $9,360 for sixty-five- to seventy-year-olds 
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individuals to select a different age at which to start the annuity. Individuals 
feeling a liquidity pinch at an earlier age could receive an actuarially reduced 
pension at an earlier age. (Of course the paternalism that underlies a forced 
savings program should limit the minimum age at which such a claim can be 
made.) Alternatively, individuals who are not feeling a pinch at age sixty-five 
might prefer to delay receipt of this pension. Since the private annuity market 
is very imperfect (high markups and limited indexing), an individual might 
prefer having a larger annuity starting later rather than starting an annuity now, 
which includes the option of taking the payments and using them to buy further 
annuities. The obvious difficulty  with  simply allowing such a choice is the 
adverse selection problem associated with life expectancy: those with longer 
life expectancy would be more likely to delay the start of benefits in return for 
increased benefits once started. Considering both earlier and later starting dates 
for benefits, one can ask about limiting choice based on an earnings test. That 
is, one might only allow an early start of benefits for retired workers, and one 
might  require  the  start  of  benefits  once retired  beyond  some  age.  Thus, 
allowing the claiming of benefits by workers age sixty-two to seventy can be 
viewed in one of two different lights. First, it is a form of paternalism requiring 
workers to wait to receive higher benefits. Second, it relates to adverse selec- 
tion that the trade-off between earlier benefits and higher benefits will be se- 
lected by  workers  in light of  their life expectancies. Without the use of the 
earnings test, choice of date to start benefits will depend on the shadow interest 
rates for individual calculations, which are no doubt related to earnings flows 
as well as wealth levels. The presence of an earnings test therefore seems to 
be a useful supplement to the incentives and the deviation of the change in 
benefits from a purely actuarial pattern, even if the actuarial adjustment is de- 
liberately different from actuarially fair. 
Defined-Benefit und Defined-Contribution Formulas 
In this context of a government-designed and -run social insurance system, 
the differences between  defined-benefit  and defined-contribution approaches 
lie in the differences generated by the types of formulas likely to be used and 
the differences in the ways the two systems are likely to be adapted to changing 
circumstances. In terms of typical formulas, there are four differences that are 
worth noting. A defined-benefit formula is normally related to past earnings, 
while  a defined-contribution formula  is normally related  to past  taxes. The 
conventional defined-benefit formula begins by calculating an average lifetime 
wage and thus aggregates nominal wages in different years by  a wage index. 
The defined-contribution formula aggregates by means of an interest rate. The 
defined-contribution formula aggregates all years with positive taxes, while a 
standard average earnings approach calculates an average over some number 
of years (thirty-five in the United States). The approach to redistribution  in 
a defined-benefit approach is by  progressivity  in the benefit formula, usually 
designed from consideration of the wage-related replacement rate; the defined- 89  Pension Reform in a Transition Economy: Poland and Chile 
contribution approach could redistribute on the basis of the size of  accumu- 
lated funds, but seems less likely, politically, to do so. In Chile, redistribution 
is in the form of a guaranteed minimum pension. However, the minimum pen- 
sion is financed from general revenue, not social security revenue. With only 
part of  the labor force included in the social security system, it seems appro- 
priate to have a broader tax base for redistribution purposes. 
While I have focused on the differences in the two approaches, it is perhaps 
useful to notice that in a mature system, in a smooth, stable economy, the dif- 
ferences  may be small. In particular, if tax rates do not change, there is no 
difference between relying on wages subject to tax and relying on taxes paid. 
It is probably  not  a bad approximation  of many  mature economies that the 
wage growth rate and the nominal interest rate are roughly equal on average. 
In a transition economy, however, one would expect large differences between 
the interest rate and the wage growth rate. There are probably small differences 
across people in the implications of extending the averaging period a few more 
years. Thus, the major difference is accommodation to shocks and transitions. 
There is also a difference  in the likely response  to foreseen  changes,  such 
as the demographic swing coming early next century. I will return to this issue 
in the next section, where the role of funding is discussed in relation to shocks 
and transitions. 
In terms of promised benefits, both approaches can be seen as specific sim- 
plified approximations to a more general benefit determination function. That 
is, consider determining the benefits for a new retiree as a function of the entire 
history  of  both  the individual  and the economy up to that  date; the benefit 
depends on the full history of earnings subject to tax, the history of tax rates, 
the history of interest rates, and any other variables that one might like to add 
to an expanded conception of the design of an insurance mechanism responsive 
to both individual risks and social risks. It is not clear what elements would go 
into deciding which of the two common approaches is a better approximation 
of an optimal design. Of course such a question cannot be answered without a 
prior determination of what an optimal design might look like, a question that 
has not been addressed in the literature as far as I know. In particular, the litera- 
ture typically ignores issues involving the general health of  the economy. In 
practice, the state of the economy often results in ad hoc adjustments of general 
benefit levels. Of course this opens up the level of descriptive complexity (and, 
often, mismanagement) that comes with repeated ad hoc adjustments of bene- 
fit levels. 
10.3.3  Chile 
In  1981, Chile introduced a new, fully funded social security system with 
individual accounts.2h  Retirees and older workers were kept on the old system; 
26. I have drawn on several descriptions of  social security in Chile, including Cheyre V. (1991), 
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younger workers switching to the new system had special government bonds 
allocated to them and have their payroll taxes go into their accounts. This fund- 
ing pattern meant an enormous expense for the government, financed out of 
general revenues. The deficit in the pension system increased from 2.2 percent 
of GDP in  1980 to 6.6 percent  (including borrowing from the new pension 
funds) in  1986 (Mesa-Lago  1991). The new system is a mandatory defined- 
contribution system (with contributions only from workers) for old age, survi- 
vor, and disability benefits (although a guaranteed minimum benefit was re- 
tained). These funds are managed by private firms, called AFPs (Administra- 
doras de Fondos de Pensiones). At present, there are thirteen, with the four 
largest having 75 percent of the insured. The AFPs are heavily regulated and 
meant to compete. The set of allowable investments and the portfolio fractions 
allowed in riskier investments have grown slowly over time. The government 
guarantees a minimal return of the lesser of  (1) the average return on all funds 
less 2 percent and (2) half the average return on all  Workers are free 
to switch their accumulated funds between AFPs every three months. On re- 
tirement, the  accumulated  funds are used to purchase indexed annuities, or 
they can be taken in a phased withdrawal (or a combination of the two). 
The experience of these funds to date has been very favorable for workers. 
The annual average real yield for all invested assets for the period  1981-90 
was  13 percent  (Vittas and Iglesias  1992). The return  for  1991 is about 30 
percent. While it would be tempting to attribute these high rates of return to 
the power of competitive markets, I think that this attribution would be mis- 
placed. The funds have been heavily regulated, no doubt reflecting the Chilean 
experience with the collapse of their banking system, which was bailed out by 
the government even though the funds were not guaranteed. Overwhelmingly, 
the funds have been in government bonds and in bank liabilities, both deposits 
and mortgage bonds. Investment in shares did not exceed 1 percent of the port- 
folio until  1984 and reached 8.1 percent in  1988 (Mesa-Lago  1991) and 20 
percent in  1991. There is a committee to select the  set of  stocks in  which 
AFPs can invest. Thus, the high returns have reflected high real interest rates 
generally rather than excellent investment decisions. It is important to remem- 
ber that, when the portfolio is in government debt, a high rate of return is an 
increase in government obligations. That is, if the rate of return is higher than 
the rate that would have resulted in approximately the same aggregate pensions 
as under the previous defined-benefit system, then there is an increase in gov- 
ernment obligations beyond what would have been present under the previous 
system. Only when  the  portfolio  is invested  (directly or indirectly)  in  real 
assets does a higher rate of  return  represent  a greater sum of resources for 
the economy. 
27. Each fund has a reserve fund, and the government has a fluctuations reserve fund to finance 
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The pattern of portfolio holdings also makes it clear that having individual 
accounts does not necessarily translate into a more positive government budget 
balance. In order to know what has happened to government budget balance, 
one needs to infer the implications of  individual accounts for other tax in- 
creases or expenditure cuts to finance the benefits that are no longer directly 
financed by  the taxes now  flowing into individual accounts. The experience 
probably does show how  defined-contribution pensions are likely to show a 
different growth over time than defined-benefit pensions, although one wants 
a longer time series before reaching conclusions on long-run effects. 
The rate of  return on the portfolios held by  the AFPs does not translate 
directly into the return on taxes for workers since there are commission costs 
that must be paid and are deducted from the account or bundled with monthly 
payments. The structure of these costs is regulated.28  Net commissions are cur- 
rently around 15 percent of contributions, down from 23 percent in the early 
years (Vittas and Iglesias 1992). The marketing and sales costs amounted to 
39.8 percent of total operating costs exclusive of depreciation and amortization 
in  1982 and 30 percent in  1983 (Arellano 1985, cited in Mackenzie 1988). 
Currently, marketing costs are estimated to run in the range from 30  to 40 
percent of  operating costs (Vittas and Iglesias 1992). In  contrast with these 
numbers, administrative costs for the cash benefits portion of U.S.  Social Secu- 
rity were 0.9 percent of benefits paid in 1990 (U.S.  Department of Health and 
Human Services, Social Security Bulletin 54, no. 9 [1991]: 19), and, as noted 
above, administrative costs in Poland are currently 4 percent, including 2 per- 
cent for the post office for delivery of benefits. Instead, the privatized system 
has costs that resemble those of life insurance markets. 
The Role of Funds 
There are two dimensions to building up individual funds. One dimension 
relates to a possible decision to have a time shape of taxes that generates a fund 
that is different from a time shape that does not generate a fund. Obviously, any 
change in the time shape of taxes represents a redistribution across generations 
and across individuals in the same generation with different lifetime earnings 
patterns. When a fund is being created that did not otherwise exist and there is 
no particular plan to make taxes in the future different from what was origi- 
nally planned, then we  are not considering this dimension of  the effect of 
building up a fund. Rather, we are converting an implicit liability into an ex- 
plicit one, changing the characteristics of the obligation as a result. 
First, such a changeover affects the politics of social insurance expenditures. 
Second, there is the question of the extent to which funding, both in the short 
run and in the long run, affects the expenditures on the rest of the budget. This 
28. The design of this structure has important distributional implications. The mix of charges 
per account, per peso deposited, and per peso on deposit affects the returns on taxes of workers 
with different earnings levels and different histories. The choice of mix has been a source of 
controversy in Chile. 92  Peter Diamond 
depends a lot on  the nature of the political process and the role of different 
measures of the budget deficit in that determination. It is to my mind an open 
question whether the use of  individual accounts has a further effect on this 
outcome beyond the role of funding in the aggregate. A third question that is 
addressed below is the role of  individual accounts and private management in 
the workings and development of the capital market. 
The presence of an aggregate fund is likely to have a significant effect on 
the politics of the evolution of a social insurance system. In considering such 
effects, it is natural to think in terms of a two-by-two matrix. One dimension 
relates to whether earmarked taxes are above or below the benefit flows. The 
other dimension refers to social insurance expenditures and other government 
expenditures. (In addition, one should consider the effect of  a fund on legisla- 
tion in advance of short-run difficulties.) I do not know of solid empirical work 
on political responses to fill in the elements in this matrix. But it is useful to 
state the questions that arise in the four boxes. Assume that the earmarked tax 
flow exceeds the current benefit flow. Does the presence of a fund (into which 
the excess flows rather than flowing into general revenues) affect the continua- 
tion of the current levels of earmarked taxes and benefits? Would taxes be more 
likely to be cut or benefits more likely to be raised if the excess did not flow 
into a fund? Considering the politics of the full budget, rather than just the 
social insurance budget, an excess of earmarked taxes over current expendi- 
tures is probably powerful protection against a cut in benefits even when the 
rest of the government budget is in trouble. In the adjoining entry in the matrix, 
the question is the extent to which this surplus flow affects other government 
taxes and other government expenses. My own impression of the process in 
the United States is that recent Social Security annual surpluses have indeed 
had some effect on other government expenditures even though the money was 
flowing into a fund. That is, it is not clear how much larger the deficit on the 
rest of the budget would be if the Social Security surplus went to general reve- 
nues rather than to a fund. Whether having the money flow into a fund limited 
the size of other expenditures is too subtle to be inferred from the casual evi- 
dence at hand. 
In the row where earmarked taxes do not cover current benefits, the presence 
of interest on a fund and the presence of the fund itself seem likely to affect 
the behavior of the social insurance account. That is, the state of the fund has 
an independent political effect. The effect of such a continued short-run deficit 
on other expenditures is more difficult to have a feeling for. One also needs to 
examine the role of a fund in the likelihood that the social insurance system 
will be in such a position. That is, a fund that appears to be in trouble, now or 
in the future, contributes to the possibility that benefits, at least benefits out in 
the future, will be reduced below then-legislated levels and that increases in 
the earmarked taxes will also be voted in advance. 
Given  the desirability  of  lead  times  for pension  planning,  the  forward- 
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system so that large changes can be introduced with sizable lead times with a 
strictly  defined pay-as-you-go  system, there is a general consensus that one 
wants to protect the retired from sudden changes in benefit levels. Moreover, 
it is difficult (although not impossible) to design a sequence of benefit changes 
in response to short-run fiscal positions so that they add up to a sensible over- 
all design. 
I suspect that having individual accounts rather than an aggregate fund con- 
tributes to the protection of social insurance benefits from short-run fiscal dif- 
ficulties. This protection is only limited, however. The opportunity to change 
tax treatment of benefits represents another way of altering benefits, at least up 
to the point where benefits  are taxes on the same basis  as other income (a 
situation that already holds in Poland). This is probably a natural barrier to the 
height of taxation of  social insurance benefits.  Tax  treatment of  the interest 
earnings of individual funded accounts is another way of altering benefits. Sim- 
ilarly, there is the possibility  of requirements  to invest in low-yield socially 
preferred assets.*' 
The focus in this discussion has been on the response of the social insurance 
system to short-run difficulties.  Given the demographics of a steadily  aging 
population, true in Poland  as it is in Chile and the United  States, it is also 
appropriate to ask how the presence of a fund affects the politics of adapting 
the social insurance system to this ongoing phenomenon. A fund represents a 
mechanism for adapting to such a change in a different way than a sequence 
of simultaneous tax and benefit changes. The presence of a fund may contrib- 
ute to advance legislation for dealing with such a problem. Thus, in the United 
States, legislation  to cut benefits (by delaying the normal retirement age but 
not the age of eligibility for benefits) beginning in 2000 was passed in 1983. 
This was without doubt an easier problem for the legislature than would occur 
with  a later response. Moreover, one can expect that, on average, decisions 
taken with less time pressure will be better and better integrated. 
Fund Management 
In Chile, individual accounts are partially invested in the economy, and that 
investment is handled by private portfolio managers.'O  There are three sorts of 
questions that come to mind when considering investment of  the fund in the 
economy. One is the extent of real effects on the allocation of capital. Presum- 
ably, the less well developed the capital market, the larger the effects of  di- 
rected investment. That is, in the United States, it is likely that general portfolio 
adjustments would make the shift of a Social Security fund from Treasury debt 
to stock market holdings somewhat offset by  private  portfolio adjustments. 
29. In the United States, there have been repeated calls to move the Social Security trust fund 
partially out of Treasury debt and into direct investments in infrastructure. It is not clear how this 
generates revenue for pension payment. 
30. Another model of funds being invested in the economy can be found in some Asian econ- 
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The small changes in interest rates on different types of assets would probably 
not have large effects on the U.S. economy. Of course it remains the case that 
any differences in rates of return will affect benefits determined by a defined- 
contribution  formula  and  may  affect  the  legislated  level  of  benefits  in  a 
defined-benefit formula. In a less well-developed capital market, the final inci- 
dence of investment plans will be much closer to the initial incidence. Thus, 
there is room for a significant effect on capital allocation. This is discussed 
further below. Second, one must ask the question of the response of the system 
to the bearing of  risk  that is a natural counterpart of investments  in riskier 
assets than Treasury debt. To what extent will the political  process de facto 
insure the investments being made. If this is indeed the case, as experience in 
Chile and elsewhere with the banking system suggests, then the general capital 
allocation process and the role of government guarantees needs to be thought 
thr~ugh.~' 
The question of  asset choice for funds must also face the question of the 
transfer of funds between different fund managers. The presence of a signifi- 
cant part of a portfolio in terms of assets that are not readily evaluated by the 
market opens up the possibility  of runs. Having significant movement out of 
some fund at a point of time raises the problem of the effect on the market of 
the sale of assets on well-organized markets as well, Purchases by the funds to 
which accounts are moved need not coincide with sales by the funds losing 
accounts. If  this movement is not regulated in some way,  there could be sig- 
nificant gains and losses associated with such movements, as a forced sale is 
combined with an unforced  set of purchases. This can happen even when all 
assets are regularly traded if funds are large relative to the market, as they are 
in  Chile. Possibly, one should consider the  option  of  transferring  divisible 
assets rather than their value. The possibility of runs is not restricted to individ- 
uals  who monitor the  performance  of  their funds closely. As experience in 
Ohio has shown, there can be runs by normally passive investors when some 
event has raised the question of the safety of the funds in a salient way.32 
The third question is the role of portfolio managers and their regulation. We 
know that even the most highly regulated capital markets in the world today are 
subject to criminal behavior that involves sizable losses of funds. It is natural to 
wonder whether similar problems would happen  with  these funds. In Chile, 
portfolio decisions are very tightly regulated by the government, with the ma- 
jority of funds necessarily invested in government securities or bank deposits. 
The process of development of  the funds has reflected a very slow widening 
of investment opportunities. It seems to me unlikely that private forced savers 
can be relied on to do much in the way of serious overseeing of funds; in fact, 
3 1. The likelihood of government guarantees in case the funds do not have earnings rates as 
high as were forecast has been recognized by Topinski and Wisniewski (1991a). 
32. In Ohio, there were mns on sound banks because the deposit insurance fund was thought to 
be inadequately financed. For a description of a recent run in Missouri triggered by  rumors of a 
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there is probably a serious cost associated with trying to rely on the market in 
this case. 
This concern with the costs of private markets starts with the expenses that 
will be associated with attempts by portfolios managers to compete for han- 
dling of the funds. Advertising and sales commissions are a natural part of the 
expense  associated  with  insurance  markets  and  portfolio  management  of 
funds. As noted  above, returns on portfolios are not the  same as returns on 
taxes paid. In this case, the presence of large numbers of inexperienced invest- 
ors suggests that the aggregate selling costs will more closely resemble that for 
individual policies in insurance markets than it will selling costs for portfolio 
management in well-developed capital markets like the United States. If that 
is the case, then a sizable fraction of the value of the funds will be eaten up in 
the competitive process. There is an obvious internal contradiction between 
having a forced savings system based on a lack of reliance on individuals to 
save adequately for their own retirement and the empowering of these people 
to control the management of their portfolios. In particular, the implicit high 
discount rate of such workers raises questions as to whether they will respond 
to solicitation to change managers in a way  that will overweight the current 
blandishments of  solicitation relative to the possible long-run effects on the 
value of the account. I am told that, already in Chile, running shoes are being 
given out to workers switching between funds.33  This is reminiscent of the time 
in the United States when interest rates were regulated and banks competed by 
giving out toasters to people opening accounts. An even closer parallel is the 
report of  a school in England, where there are education vouchers, that “of- 
fered a discount on shower units as an incentive to parents to enroll their chil- 
dren there” (New York Times, 7 January  1992, l). The cost of  private firms 
pursuing  individual fund account holders may be very large, and there is an 
important role for regulation  to avoid such an equilibrium. I think that it is 
natural to be very suspicious about the efficiency of the competitive market in 
this type  of  intertemporal transaction  involving  large numbers of  inexperi- 
enced investors. 
Another problem arises with the conversion of accumulated funds into annu- 
ities. The annuities market is a relatively underdeveloped market even in ad- 
vanced economies. There is no reason to think that this market will work with 
reasonable efficiency on the basis of individual purchases. Of course there is a 
range of alternative  interventions for organizing this market besides simply 
having the government do it. This is discussed further below. 
10.3.4  Transition 
When setting up accounts for existing workers at the start of such a program, 
there are two bases for selecting account levels. One is to be backward looking, 
33. Such incentives for switching are illegal. Regulation of the marketing process is an im- 
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giving individuals an approximation of what they would have had had the new 
system been in place. The alternative is to be forward looking, giving individu- 
als a sum that will yield approximately what the existing system would yield. 
This can be done with a sum that can be invested or with bonds that come due 
at retirement age. In Chile, bonds that grew at a real rate of  4 percent per 
year were allocated to individual workers. The underlying logic was forward 
looking, aiming at a Pareto impr~vernent.'~  In Poland, the proposal is to be 
forward looking. The calculations that have been made imply that men under 
forty-five and women  under forty would  not  lose from the changeover and 
would receive no initial compensation. Older highly paid workers would re- 
ceive compensation, with the amount drawn from a share of the value of enter- 
prises being privatized  (Tymowska and Wisniewski  1991). This assumes not 
only a satisfactory projected basis for compensation but also a reasonably ac- 
curate valuation of the shares being distributed. 
One complication, of course, is the absence of earnings records for individ- 
ual workers in Poland. Thus, the proposal keys off a single year's earnings at 
the time the funds are set up. This is highly random in its implied redistribu- 
tions and highly subject to manipulation. An alternative approach would be to 
make use of additional years of earnings as they become available. There are 
probably a number of different ways of doing this that should be explored. The 
current proposal gives an individual an initial allocation that is a multiple of 
earnings (above the threshold) determined in the year the accounts are started, 
with the multiple depending on age. Instead, the multiplier could be allocated 
to a number of the remaining years until retirement age. For example, instead 
of giving someone an initial allocation of twice the level of earnings above the 
threshold in the first year of the transition, the individual could be given half 
that sum the first year and an additional amount the following year equal to the 
amount of the following year's  earnings, less that year's threshold. This second 
number could be adjusted for interest. This pattern would both be fairer and 
have a better incentive structure. 
10.3.5  An Alternative Proposal 
The current Polish law is based on a defined-benefit formula that may be 
easily manipulated and that has limited long-run appeal. The proposed reform 
is focused on a privatized role in asset markets. The problems of  regulating 
such a privatized system may be severe. If one considers a defined-contribution 
system that invests only in government debt, it may be possible  to design a 
system that is politically acceptable, has some effect on fiscal discipline, and 
has better incentives. The following simple proposal is put forward to show 
how such an approach might work, perhaps thereby stimulating development 
34. One problem was the absence of  a complete set of  records for individual  workers.  Bond 
levels were calculated on the basis of the average of declared income for three years (1977-79). 97  Pension Reform in a Transition Economy: Poland and Chile 
of more detailed proposals that fit with Poland’s political and economic con- 
straints. 
The current benefit law has two parts, a flat benefit and an earnings-related 
benefit. Consider earmarking part of the payroll  tax for defined-contribution 
pensions. Consider dividing the earmarked tax between a general account and 
individual accounts. The general account finances the flat benefit. The individ- 
ual account finances the earnings-related  benefit. Either or both benefits  can 
be subjected to an earnings test. To  implement this system, one needs a rule 
for selecting an interest rate and an actuarial formula for converting an accu- 
mulated fund into an indexed annuity. 
This approach lends itself to a straightforward transition that does not rely 
on individual records. Each eligible worker can be credited with an indexed 
benefit to begin at the same time as the flat benefit. The indexed benefit would 
depend solely on age at the time of transition. An algorithm is still needed to 
determine the structure of this benefit. One could be constructed along lines 
parallel to the analysis done for the proposed reform. 
With individual accounts in place, in the future one could consider priva- 
tizing part of the accumulation of individual accounts, once there were better 
understanding  and  skills for regulating privatized accounts. Contrasting this 
proposal with both current law and the proposed reform highlights the many 
different pieces relevant for design of a pension system. 
10.4  Relation to Private Institutions: Capital, Annuity, and 
Pension Markets 
Returning to the discussion of Poland, it is natural to think about the role of 
this pension reform in the development of the capital market and in the priva- 
tization of state enterprises. It also seems useful to mention issues in organiz- 
ing the annuity and private pension markets. 
10.4.  I  The Polish Capital Market 
Economies converting from central planning to decentralized markets do not 
have well-developed capital markets. To my way of  thinking, the most critical 
missing piece is a set of intermediaries. The creation of pension funds seeking 
to invest does not directly do anything about the lack of experience and capac- 
ity in the allocation of funds. Since the development of mutual funds is a (prob- 
ably small) piece of the development of the range of intermediaries, one can 
count the creation of  such institutions by this proposal  as a contribution  to 
institution  development.  However,  government-regulated,  and  probably  im- 
plicitly insured, funds with a large number of small investors is probably not 
the best environment for the growth of such institutions. It would probably be 
better to have private market mutual funds receiving deposits from a smaller 
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greater importance when  intermediaries are weak. Thus, it is appropriate to 
wonder whether the nonintermediated investment that will be displaced by this 
forced saving program might not have greater effi~iency.~~  Restating this point 
in a different vocabulary, the question is whether to let the demand for mutual 
funds respond to market opportunities or to generate demand in order to induce 
a larger supply of  intermediaries. Of course, there is room for foreign assis- 
tance in intermediation, limiting concern about pushing too fast. 
A further set of issues arises when  one starts to contemplate the kind of 
investments,  other than government securities, that these funds might  hold. 
Obviously, the prime purpose of having such a program is to support new in- 
vestment. Thus, direct loans from these funds to large firms is one possibility, 
although it is a possibility fraught with all the same difficulties that are present 
in the inadequacy of the banking system in channeling funds directly to firms. 
The alternative that is natural with developed capital markets, of  having the 
funds invest in the securities market, is much less attractive in this setting. The 
securities market is extremely underdeveloped, suggesting that a large fraction 
of the funds flowing into the market will go into bidding up the prices of ex- 
isting securities and so be transfers to existing securityholders rather than be- 
ing a flow into new investment. (One could consider restricting investment to 
the purchase of  new issues-including  those associated with privatization- 
although there is unlikely to be an adequate flow of new issues to supply many 
good securities for such investment.) Second, some of the funds will flow into 
manipulation and outright theft. Only a fraction of the funds will go into en- 
couraging investment. My uninformed prior is that the fraction is rather small 
and that direct general investment stimulation by  the government would be a 
superior rnechani~m.~~  Creating a suitable environment for (possibly foreign) 
private mutual fund creation is probably  a better route to institution creation 
than creating a forced demand for such institutions and hoping to create their 
supply simultaneously, with a larger government  obligation for protection  of 
investors. Presumably, there  is a great shortage of experienced regulators of 
financial intermediaries in Poland. One question that must be addressed by the 
proposal for individual funded accounts is whether the regulation of the firms 
handling such accounts is the best use of limited regulatory abilities. 
10.4.2  Transition to Private Ownership 
Like other centrally planned economies converting to a private market or- 
ganization for the bulk  of  the economy, Poland faces the problem  of  rede- 
termining the ownership of firms. It seems useful to divide this problem into 
three pieces. One is the creation of some private ownership in order to create 
the ownership part of  the ownership-management  relationship, which deter- 
35. On the role of  direct lending to friends and family, see Ben-Porath (1978). 
36. Case-by-case  direct stimulation is subject to the same potentialities of fraud and misman- 
agement. 99  Pension Reform in a Transition Economy: Poland and Chile 
mines the rules and incentives under which firms are managed. A second issue 
is the ownership of future income. Since one does not need to allocate all of 
ownership to have enough  ownership to create a relationship with manage- 
ment, these two issues are clearly separable. The third issue is to develop insti- 
tutions for the ongoing role of ownership in policing management. This ongo- 
ing role includes bankruptcy, sale of ownership, takeovers, etc. This third step 
is clearly slower and of less initial importance and compatible with a variety 
of other institutions. 
It is natural to inquire into the role of a public pension system in filling each 
of these roles. An active role in overseeing management must involve either 
explicit institution design for overseeing  (such  as public representatives on 
boards of directors) or ownership shares (either individual or aggregated) that 
have enough of a stake in a firm to oversee management. Thus, it is commonly 
felt that a widespread individual distribution of  share ownership would  not 
easily  generate any concentrations  of  ownership  sufficient  to overcome  the 
free-rider problem and so have relatively efficient overseeing of management. 
It is therefore frequently proposed that mutual funds be used to aggregate own- 
ership shares and so have an incentive (and obligation) to oversee management. 
Pension plans can clearly be used in this role in place of mutual fund compa- 
nies. In terms of ownership shares and obligations, the two institutions seem 
similar in the short run. 
For the longer run, there are several differences in the way the two institu- 
tions might work. Since the payout of  pension plans is based on retirement 
behavior of  workers having claims on the assets of  the funds, this could be 
used as a device to transfer shares into the pool of  individually  owned and 
traded shares slowly. This would contribute to the third aim, of a slowly grow- 
ing private market. Second, there is a fiscal problem for the Polish government. 
By substituting the funding of some pension obligations for the one-time gen- 
eral gift of ownership, there should be a reduced  claim on the government 
budget in the future. This could be done in a way that tends to place the risk of 
success of Polish enterprises either on the benefit claimants or on the govern- 
ment. With political pressure to move ownership out of the hands of the gov- 
ernment, it might be sufficient to move it to an earmarked use, as in pensions. 
Such an allocation opens up the issue of the age-related structure of the alloca- 
tion of this wealth to individuals. While a direct giveaway could have any age 
structure, the use of pension funds naturally structures this question while leav- 
ing room for a variety of answers, depending in part on the offset from other 
government pension obligations that are part of the package. For example, the 
proposal discussed above had  an allocation based on a forward-looking re- 
placement of part of pension obligations. Whether shares are allocated to indi- 
vidual accounts or to an aggregate fund is open. Individual accounts could be 
used to create another level of  incentive  in the presence of  multiple funds. 
However, such allocation does place individuals at additional risk. There is 
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some “compensation” of workers for a change in the pension system, as in the 
Polish proposal described above. The use of the vocabulary of  compensation 
may affect the likelihood of later government compensation in the event that 
the assets prove to be worth less than anticipated. 
10.4.3  The Annuity Market 
Another issue that is raised by individual accounts is the problem of conver- 
sion of accumulated funds to annuities at the time of retirement. The individual 
annuities market does not function very well anywhere in the world, as we can 
expect from the theory of adverse selection.”  Thus, this market would need to 
be organized and regulated by the government if the pension system is to work 
well. Since to date few pensions have been received out of the new system in 
Chile, there has not been so much concern about how well the annuities market 
functions.i8 There are a variety  of ways for the government to organize this 
market that lie between  full reliance  on the private market  and government 
provision of annuities. A variety of regulatory schemes have been proposed for 
health insurance, which could be adapted for annuities.3y 
10.4.4  Regulation of Private Pensions 
Unless the social insurance  system is so large that there is little room for 
private  saving for retirement,  it is natural  to expect  that  employer-provided 
pensions will arise as an in~titution.~~  This is an institution that needs serious 
regulation. One of  the worst  possible outcomes would  be unfunded private 
pension promises where the workers did not save because they believed exces- 
sively in the likelihood of collecting on these promises, while firms and share- 
holders did not save because of a recognition that the risk-adjusted expenditure 
needs were not very large. This combination would depress capital accumula- 
tion and do little to deal with retirement needs. Thus, it is a common phenome- 
non for governments to worry about the funding of pension promises, an issue 
that arises particularly with defined-benefit pensions. More generally, the his- 
tory of private pensions is a history of the need for consumer protection legisla- 
tion. Pension promises are very complicated assets. Individual workers are not 
37. Adverse selection can be a problem when individual retirees choose between phased with- 
drawal or annuity purchase on the basis of  asymmetrical information on life expectancy. Adverse 
selection can also be a problem when insurance companies particularly  seek out those with shorter 
life expectancies, incurring additional marketing costs. From a social insurance perspective, one 
needs to consider the optimal degree of  cross-subsidization between groups with different life 
expectancies; those with longer retirement periods are, in one sense, poorer. 
38. There are  independent brokers  charging sizable fees for counseling retirees on annuity 
choice. 
39. One could, e.g., consider mandatory  grouping of  individuals into risk pools with private 
market bidding on the groups. Such a proposal  has been made for health insurance in the United 
States (Diamond 1992). 
40. The proposed reform described above would allow individuals to contribute voluntarily  to 
their individual  fund accounts on a tax-deferred basis. Similarly, in Chile, there is favorable tax 
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generally  sophisticated enough to appreciate the risks associated  with these 
assets. Thus, there has arisen in the United States a set of rules designed to 
protect the expectations of  workers that are taken to be legitimate. 
With a defined-contribution pension, individuals are promised whatever an- 
nuities their accumulated funds will purchase when they reach retirement. The 
retirement  implications  of  such funds are somewhat difficult  to describe to 
workers because they depend on projections of interest rates and actuarial fac- 
tors, which one does not project with certainty. However, defined-contribution 
pensions have the obvious advantages that they are more readily perceived as 
having the same value to both sides of the promise and involve no portability 
difficulties when there is to be labor mobility. Defined-benefit pensions  are 
easier to describe to workers in large part because the description focuses only 
on the circumstance of the worker staying with the same firm until retirement, 
the firm doing well, and the worker having steady wage increases. Introducing 
the various other scenarios, such as worker mobility, firm bankruptcy, and low 
future wages because of industry or firm difficulties, makes this much more 
complicated to describe. Also complicated to describe is an adequate level of 
funding. In an economy that does not have a well-developed  actuarial profes- 
sion, it is implausible  that funding for defined-benefit pensions  can be ade- 
quately policed. If the government is to enter this arena by allowing tax recog- 
nition  for the development  of pension  funds, then serious thought  needs to 
be given to the class of pension  systems that will get tax-favored treatment. 
Restricting tax-favored treatment to defined-contribution pensions is a way of 
avoiding a host of potential difficulties. In other words, the issues appropriate 
for comparing defined-benefit and defined-contribution pensions are very dif- 
ferent  when  considering  private market pensions  and social insurance  pen- 
sions. The latter can be based on employment records throughout the economy 
and do not have to adapt to the needs of labor mobility. Moreover, the risks 
associated with the ability to pay pensions are different for governments and 
individual firms. On the other hand, the process of adapting the system to a 
changing environment is driven differently by a political process and a market 
process (whether collective bargaining or not). 
In the United States, the government also enters directly into guarantees to 
workers about some of the funds available for their pensions. Insurance against 
some risks  associated  with fund accumulation  by  intermediaries  is a wide- 
spread aspect of  well-developed capital markets. Thus, it is common for there 
to be insurance provided by either the government or the industry against well- 
defined criminal activities involving stealing funds. Because it is very difficult 
for individuals to police this issue themselves, this is a natural role for some 
sort of collective institution. The question is the extent to which the govern- 
ment should go beyond fund-based guarantees to look at promise-based guar- 
antees.  It  is very  easy for such guarantees  to turn into a basis  for political 
manipulation, and such redistribution was indeed a major part of the develop- 
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mechanism can encourage behavior that adds considerably to the magnitude 
of  the risk borne by taxpayers (see, e.g., Bodie 1992). 
10.5  Concluding Remarks 
This has been a long paper, rambling through a wide variety of policy issues. 
It would serve no point to recapitulate all of them. An underlying theme of my 
approach may be worth recapitulating. Poland faces serious short-run financial 
difficulties both  in general  and with its social insurance system. Like many 
other countries, Poland faces a large demographic swing early in the next cen- 
tury with long-run financial consequences. Poland also faces a major need to 
develop institutional design of its pension system. It is difficult for the political 
process to separate out the three elements of short-run financial concerns, long- 
run financial concerns, and institutional design. One can only hope that a bal- 
ance among these elements will be struck in the process of reform. 
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The establishment of a pension system in Eastern Europe and the former So- 
viet Union is a very important issue. The proportion of the population of these 
countries that is retired or disabled is very high, yet they lack a functioning tax 
system that can provide sufficient revenues to finance the costs. The old system 
is very inadequate to deal with the issues of tax compliance, work incentives, 
equity, and corruption that will arise with the operation of a public pension 
program in a decentralized economy. In practical terms, these countries will 
have to start from scratch in designing new pension programs, and the question 
addressed in Peter Diamond’s paper is what that new system should look like. 
The choice is between a defined-benefit program, similar to that of most indus- 
trial countries, and a defined-contribution program, like that of Chile. A choice 
must also be made between a publicly and a privately managed system. 104  Peter Diamond 
The paper covers a very wide range of issues relevant to establishing a social 
security system in Eastern Europe. To begin with, it provides a great deal of 
background  information  about  the  existing  defined-benefit  system  and  the 
problems  that will be faced in an attempt to extend it in the future.  I think 
that that material is valuable in laying out the primary issues associated with 
operating a conventional defined-benefit program. 
Subsequently, a major portion of the paper is devoted to evaluating a specific 
reform proposal that combines a flat minimum benefit payment, financed out 
of general revenues, with a privately managed, defined-contribution plan, simi- 
lar to that of Chile. From a macroeconomic perspective, a defined-contribution 
program is attractive as a potential means of augmenting national saving; it is 
a funded system. From a microeconomic  perspective,  it avoids some of the 
political problems of keeping benefits at affordable levels. 
Most  articles on the Chilean program  emphasize the high rates of  return 
earned by the funds. Diamond’s analysis was a major surprise to me in pointing 
out two serious problems of  the Chilean system that have not attracted much 
prior attention. First, the high rate of return is a simple reflection of the fact that 
the Chilean stabilization program has driven the real rate of return on riskless 
investments to extremely high levels. The funds invest nearly all their portfolio 
in government bonds, where the real  interest rate has been  in excess of  10 
percent. Chileans may feel good when they look at the earnings on their funds, 
but they should be a little concerned as taxpayers who have to pay those rates 
of return on government bonds. Private equity investments have been a very 
small share of the overall portfolio. 
The second surprise is that the administrative charges by the fund managers 
represent an amazingly high percentage of contributions. It is hard to under- 
stand how these fees can be justified. If  the funds were investing in an open 
market at global rates of  return, the administrative fees would be sufficient to 
wipe out the interest return, and the realized yield of the contributors would 
be negative. 
A final problem is that  the fund accumulation  will ultimately  have to be 
converted to a private annuity at retirement. Annuities are a surprisingly poor 
bargain even in sophisticated American markets, and it is difficult to design 
them in a fashion that protects the retiree against inflation. 
One issue that will be important in Eastern Europe-one  that is not fully 
examined in this paper-is  the effect of a Chilean-type social insurance fund 
on national saving. The extent of  reliance on public debt in the portfolios of 
the Chilean pension funds suggests that their effect on national saving is am- 
biguous. The funds create a ready market in which the government can sell a 
larger volume of  debt instruments  than  would otherwise  be possible.  If  the 
existence of this debt market has made it easier for the government to finance 
budget deficits, any gain in private saving may have been lost at the national 
level. 
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view of private defined-contribution programs as an alternative social security 
system  in countries  without  advanced  financial market  institutions.  I  agree 
with Peter Diamond that financial markets may not be sufficiently developed 
in Eastern Europe to support such a system. Furthermore, the Chilean experi- 
ence is not as favorable as previously reported. 
The East  European countries  are probably  better  advised  to establish  a 
defined-benefit plan similar to those of Western Europe and the United States. 
Furthermore, for the time being, the compressed nature of the wage structure 
suggests that they could use a simple flat benefit payment for existing retirees. 
In the future, however, it is imperative that they  establish  an administrative 
system that maintains records on the contribution history of future retirees and 
relates  workers’  benefits  to past  contributions.  Furthermore,  the  idea of  a 
funded system is very attractive as a source of increased saving, but it will be 
very difficult to accomplish because of  the large existing number of retirees 
who must be provided for. 
Discussion Summary 
Boris Pleskovic noted that many privatization plans assume that pension funds 
will play a major role in the privatization  process. He said that pension funds 
are expected to receive  10-20  percent of  the equity in the newly privatized 
firms and that many planners hope that the funds will therefore take an active 
oversight role on the boards of directors of these new firms. 
Simon Johnson warned  of  the problems of loopholes in pension  schemes. 
He said that one of the largest firms in Czechoslovakia employs 500 workers, 
of which only two are oflcially employed. The rest are registered as individual 
entrepreneurs.  He noted that this setup enables the firm to avoid paying the 
social security  and wage  taxes that  are equal to 60 percent of  the wage of 
official employees. 
Mark Schaffer said Poland’s relatively high social insurance costs partially 
reflect the fact that the Polish system has indexed benefits to wages instead of 
simply indexing to the price level. The rise in real wages has driven real pen- 
sion expenditures up and contributed to the deterioration in the budget. 
Peter Diamond did not agree that pension funds should be relied on to play a 
significant oversight role as equityholders of newly privatized firms. Diamond 
wondered if there was any advantage to locating this oversight capacity in pen- 
sion funds. He said that, even in the United States, pension funds do not appear 
to be particularly sophisticated, as evidenced by their consistent pattern of rela- 
tively poor financial performance.  Olivier Blanchard was also critical of the 
idea of giving pension funds a large equity stake in privatized firms. He said 
that it is contradictory to set up a social insurance system that relies on such 
extremely risky assets. 106  Comment 
Comment  George Kopits 
The papers by Roger Gordon and Peter Diamond deal with key fiscal policy 
issues confronted by postsocialist economies. Although their primary focus is 
the reform of Poland’s tax structure and pension system, respectively, both pa- 
pers have relevance for neighboring countries, including the former Soviet re- 
publics. These remarks intend to address issues of potentially  broader rele- 
vance, rather than those that are specific only to Poland. 
In his paper, Gordon seeks to explain fiscal developments (in particular, rev- 
enue developments) since 1988 and to recommend tax reform measures. This 
explanation would be, of course, incomplete without a discussion of the overall 
fiscal relations that prevailed between the government and state-owned enter- 
prises (SOEs) and between the government and households under socialist cen- 
tral planning. Such a discussion provides the necessary backdrop for formulat- 
ing appropriate tax measures and broader systemic reforms for the transition 
to a market economy. 
From the outset, it is worth noting that, in the past, SOEs traditionally oper- 
ated under a soft budget constraint and without exposure to bankruptcy risk, 
in the pursuit of an ill-defined objective function. Accordingly, the government 
budget,  as well  as extrabudgetary  accounts controlled  by  industrial  branch 
ministries, constituted simply a channel for redistributing  financial resources 
from profitable to loss-making SOEs, to meet rigid volume targets prescribed 
in the plan. Financial resources were collected in the form of negotiated tax 
liabilities on profits, assets, depreciation, and various earmarked contributions 
or through outright confiscation of profits. In turn, these resources were distrib- 
uted  as  producer subsidies  or as capital  transfers.  Meanwhile,  households 
faced fixed retail prices to satisfy merit wants, as defined by the plan; differ- 
ences between  retail  prices  and producer  costs resulted  in  either product- 
specific turnover tax rates (positive wedges) or consumer subsidy rates (nega- 
tive wedges). Likewise, foreign trade tax rates and subsidy rates were deter- 
mined residually through domestic price controls and product-specific foreign 
exchange coefficients. In addition to these fiscal wedges, there were implicit 
taxes and subsidies determined by controls on wages and bank deposit rates. 
With the possible exception of payroll taxation for social security, taxes were 
neither parametric (across products, across enterprises, or over time) nor trans- 
parent. Statutory tax rates and tax bases had little, if any, meaning. Thus, inter- 
national comparisons, such as the one in Gordon’s table 9.1, would make more 
sense if all budget revenue from SOEs (including entrepreneurial income and 
other transfers) was shown. A similar comparison should be provided, on the 
expenditure side, of all direct subsidies and other transfers to SOEs, to reflect 
the redistributive role of the budget. By the same token, a discussion or com- 
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parison of turnover tax revenue needs to be accompanied by references to out- 
lays on consumer subsidies (see Kopits 1991). 
Reform of Poland's tax system toward uniform and fixed rates, phase-out of 
subsidies, the associated hardening of the budget constraint for SOEs, and the 
dramatic adjustment in relative prices, interest rates, and exchange rates faced 
by SOEs and households-all  of which took place almost simultaneously- 
render an interpretation of changes in the real tax revenue more difficult than 
suggested in the paper. Indeed, revenue fluctuations at constant prices, espe- 
cially in 1989-91,  reflect not only output and price changes but also changes 
in the tax  system and  accounting  conventions.'  The effect of  setting fixed 
turnover-tax rates  at the beginning of  1990 needs to be separated from the 
effects of output and price changes, to explain the revenue changes discussed 
in section 9.2.  The rise in expenditures in 1989 and the fall at the beginning of 
the adjustment program can be attributed, as noted  in the paper, to a large 
extent to the rise and then to the cut in subsidies. However, an additional expla- 
nation for the fall in other outlays in 1990 lies in the enforcement of cash limits 
on the budget-a  feature common to the initial phase in several East European 
adjustment  programs-to  ensure budget  balance  for stabilization purposes. 
The subsequent relaxation of  these limits, the rising claims on social assis- 
tance, and the adverse effect of the collapse of CMEA (Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance) trade on both the revenue and outlay sides all contrib- 
uted to the widening fiscal imbalance in 1991. 
The author flags the difficulty of balancing the budget and explores various 
forms of nonbank financing of the deficit to contain its expansionary macro- 
economic effect. Unfortunately, the scope for external financing is very limited 
in most postsocialist countries, including Poland. As indicated in the paper, 
given the low initial tax base, resorting to high tax rates would be counterpro- 
ductive. A related problem in the initial tax reform, starting with Hungary, has 
been the proliferation of  tax preferences that required compensatory tax rate 
hikes. In this regard, it is worth stressing the need to broaden tax bases so as 
to permit moderation in tax rates and a larger and more elastic revenue flow. 
The central question raised in the paper is the design of a fiscal system that 
meets a number of objectives, subject to microeconomic constraints during the 
transition. The objectives are familiar: allocative neutrality, fairness, incentives 
to work and to save, and stabilization. The micro-level constraints consist of 
inadequate administrative capacity, accounting illiteracy, and continued confu- 
sion over ownership rights, goals, and management responsibilities in SOEs. 
The value-added tax (VAT) and, under certain conditions, the cash-flow tax on 
enterprises,2 apparently advocated by  Gordon, meet the neutrality objective. 
I.  The accounting data underlying the average profit rates reported in sec. 9.2 are probably quite 
2.  For  an  assessment of  the cash-flow tax proposal for economies  in  transition, see Kopits 
unreliable and would need further elucidation to explain revenue developments. 
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Whereas the cash-flow tax has the virtue of administrative simplicity, the VAT 
requires some administrative sophistication, which is greatly compounded on 
the introduction of multiple rates for equity reasons-an  approach suggested 
in section 9.4. Instead, the equity objective can be pursued more efficiently 
through  means-tested  social  assistance  to low-income  households,  supple- 
mented with some progressivity in personal income taxation. Admittedly, both 
the progressive personal income tax and targeted assistance also entail a mini- 
mum administrative capacity,  which takes some time to develop. In fact, at 
the outset, it is necessary to resort largely to withholding  taxation, possibly 
accompanied by  presumptive techniques for self-employment income, as the 
economy is privatized. 
Perhaps the most elusive goal during the transition is macroeconomic stabi- 
lization, in view of the difficulties in financing the deficit from domestic non- 
bank and external sources and in raising tax rates. These difficulties would be 
exacerbated by a considerable net revenue loss associated with the shift from 
a profit tax to a cash-flow tax on enterprises. Moreover, fledgling private enter- 
prises engage in outright tax evasion, while SOE managers and employees col- 
lude to raise wages, nonwage  remuneration,  and bonuses  at the expense of 
profits. Also, in anticipation of possible privatization, SOE managers resort to 
asset stripping and insider deals-partly  through joint-venture arrangements. 
In addition to adverse revenue implications, this behavior leads to considerable 
wage pressures that must be contained for stabilization reasons. Thus, until the 
profit-maximizing goal of SOEs is clarified and collective bargaining evolves 
or the fear of layoffs materializes,  it is necessary to rely temporarily on the 
taxation of excess wage increases at highly progressive marginal rates. This has 
been the function of such tax-based incomes policy rather than containment of 
“competitive” wage increases, contrary to the assertion in section 9.2 of the 
paper. The adjustment of wages to market levels through increased wage dif- 
ferentiation-in  line with marginal productivity  differentials-has  not been 
prevented by this tax, which in both Poland and Czechoslovakia was triggered 
by excessive increases in the enterprise’s wage bill (including manager’s bo- 
nuses) while allowing high salaries for skilled and productive workers at one 
end and the layoff of redundant workers at the other end of the spectrum. These 
wage pressures in SOEs certainly cannot be averted simply with equal tax rates 
on their profits  and wages’  since employees do not formally  own shares in 
these enterprises. 
Therefore, consistent with incentive, allocative, administrative, and revenue 
considerations, every effort should be made during the transition to adopt- 
quite apart from a temporary  tax  on excess wage increases-broadly  based 
taxes mainly on profits, personal income, and value added, at moderate rates. 
Also, as a temporary revenue-raising measure, consideration can be given to 
3. In early  1992, Russia and Ukrainc introduced the nondeductibility  of  wages from taxable 
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the adoption  of  a nondistortionary  import tax, levied at a uniform  rate-in 
conjunction with a realistic exchange rate-above  and beyond the VAT  to be 
also imposed on imports under the destination principle. At the same time, tax 
preferences,  such as those applied earlier  in Hungary  and Poland,  must be 
quickly eliminated.  A predictable  level playing  tax field would be far more 
helpful in inducing domestic or foreign private activity than any attempt to 
fine-tune subsidies-in  order to offset credit constraints or induce positive ex- 
ternalities-to  possible “winners,” as distinct from “losers,” especially given 
that the planning instinct is still alive and well in these countries. For parity, 
the same tax rate and definition of  the base should be applicable  to private 
enterprises  and SOEs, but, in addition, SOEs could be subject to a required 
dividend payout to the budget (much like in Hungary and Poland) just as pri- 
vate enterprises are expected to yield an adequate rate of return to their owners. 
The paper by Diamond is an informative analysis of Poland’s pension reform 
that should be useful for policymakers in Poland and other postsocialist econo- 
mies. The author correctly points to the flaws in the benefit formula, the lack 
of tracking of contributions and underlying earnings of beneficiaries, the lack 
of any connection between social security administration and tax administra- 
tion, and questionable industry-specific differences in benefits. Although Po- 
land’s system has a number of superior features (taxation of pensions, linear 
accrual formula, higher official retirement age), it suffers from shortcomings 
comparable to those of  neighboring  countrie~.~  Partly on the basis of  these 
shortcomings, as well as mounting pressures for using disability pensions and 
early retirement pensions as covert unemployment benefits-in  lieu of relying 
on transparent unemployment compensation-the  financial cost of the system 
is likely to rise significantly in the period ahead. 
Failure to correct these deficiencies (including misuse of disability and early 
retirement pensions) and to enhance the cost effectiveness of  the system will 
inevitably lead to further increases in contribution rates as it has been the case 
elsewhere. The need for such increases is compounded, of course, by unfavor- 
able demographic  trends in the medium to long run. Statutory  contribution 
rates in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, and Ukraine  range between 50 
and 60 percent. With the hardening budget constraint on SOEs and the emer- 
gence of private enterprises, this tax burden is being resisted through an accu- 
mulation of contribution arrears by the former and evasion of contribution pay- 
ments by the latter and through  a narrowing of  the contribution  base (with 
increased nonwage remuneration  of employees) by both. This, in turn, adds 
pressure to raising contribution  rates further, making virtually inevitable the 
recourse to budgetary transfers for financing benefits. 
In addition to recommending corrective measures under the present system, 
the paper explores the relevance of the Chilean model for Poland. This model 
has been held  up as an example by  various authors for other economies in 
4. For an assessment of social security schemes in postsocialist countries, see Kopits (1992a). 110  Comment 
transition  (see Hanke 1990; and Deutsch 1991). In the  same vein, a recent 
proposal  for the United States is also examined. Undoubtedly, the basic ap- 
proach is in many ways appealing from the perspective of these economies and 
deserves scrutiny. Diamond’s investigation is thorough and the evaluation of 
key characteristics of  the proposed approach persuasive. On balance, two es- 
sential conditions for the successful adoption of a Chilean-type approach in 
economies in transition are missing, namely, an appropriate regulatory appara- 
tus and financial markets. Moreover, the treatment of claims by existing bene- 
ficiaries poses a difficult transitional issue under the reform proposal outlined 
in the paper. Any  solution involving  the transfer of ownership  of privatized 
SOEs to the new funds or to the beneficiaries is unlikely to provide the antici- 
pated security for old-age retirement given the questionable value and lack of 
marketability of enterprise shares. Ultimately, this could result in a consider- 
able claim on the budget.  In  any event, if Poland  or the other postsocialist 
countries were able to accumulate reserves-largely  by rationalizing the bene- 
fits-these  reserves should be translated, in the first place, into contribution 
rate cuts. 
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